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SQUEEZE PLAY: WORKERS'
COMPENSATION AND THE
PROFESSIONAL ATHLETE
STEPHEN CORMAC CARLIN* &
CHRISTOPHER M. FAIRMAN**
I. INTRODUCTION
A worker injured in the scope of his employment faces not
only the pain of and worry over the injury itself, but also the con-
comitant financial worries of the temporary or permanent inability
to continue working. Foremost among these concerns are the pay-
ment of medical bills, maintenance of ongoing financial obligations
during recuperation, and the possibility that injury may prevent a
return to the old job. Luckily for most workers, there is a program
designed to protect injured employees from the financial catastro-
phe that could accompany an on-the-job injury. The workers' com-
pensation system is designed to help the injured worker who suf-
fers an occupational disability. Workers' compensation provides
medical benefits for rehabilitation, temporary income benefits to
replace lost wages during recovery and, if permanent disability oc-
curs, impairment benefits to compensate for the loss of future
earnings. Throughout the states, all of these benefits are available
on a relatively speedy basis through an administrative agency
without most of the cost, delay, and uncertainty of a tort suit. For
most employees, workers' compensation is the safety net providing
protection after an occupational injury. From the employer's per-
spective, the workers' compensation system provides predictability
and limitation of its liability to employees injured on the job.
Unfortunately, this protection is sometimes stripped from one
particular class of workers-the professional athlete. The pro ath-
lete increasingly finds himself the victim of a squeeze play. Courts,
legislatures, and team owners are challenging player access to
workers' compensation benefits. Mired in misconceptions about
the applicability of workers' compensation to professional athletes,
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those trying to limit athletes' access have succeeded in some juris-
dictions. This article focuses on the bases and merits of these mis-
guided restrictions.
To provide background for an understanding of these restric-
tions, Part II describes the historical development of the workers'
compensation system. It explores the mechanics of the system with
emphasis on those characteristics which impact coverage of the pro
athlete. Part III examines the two primary ways professional ath-
letes' access to workers' compensation is affected. In that regard,
both statutory treatment and contractual restrictions are consid-
ered. Part IV discusses the alleged tension between the goals of the
workers' compensation system and treatment of the pro athlete.
Critical of unwarranted restrictions to athlete access, this article
identifies the fallacies employed by proponents of limitation.
Where ambiguity exists in either statutory or contractual restric-
tions, suggestions for interpretation consistent with the laudable
fundamental goals of workers' compensation are presented. Hope-
fully, this thorough comparison between workers' compensation
and its application to the pro athlete will encourage a more
thoughtful approach to coverage.
II. ADVENT OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION'
A. Purpose of the Workers' Compensation System
The workers' compensation system2 is a statutory creation
designed to compensate workers for occupational disabilities. Prior
to the enactment of these laws, employer liability was governed by
the common law principle that an employer was liable only for ac-
cidents that were the result of the employer's own negligence.8 To
recover, an injured worker was forced to prove that the injuries
1. This article uses the term "workers' compensation" and is intended to include other
authors' and legislatures' preference for the terms "workman's compensation," "workmen
compensation," "worker's compensation," or "workers compensation." The reader should
understand that we are talking about the same statutory system, regardless of the
nomenclature.
2. The workers' compensation system is not a "system" per se. Rather, each of the 50
states and the District of Columbia has its own statutory scheme. Still, there are sufficient
similarities to refer to the aggregate as a system. For a concise comparison of each of the
state workers' compensation laws see U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, 1994 ANALYSIS OF WORK-
ERS' COMPENSATION LAWS (1994).
3. See U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 2, at vi (describing the negligence
principle as it applied prior to the advent of workers' compensation); 75 TEX. JUR. 3d Work
Injury Compensation § 10 (1991) (labeling modern workers' compensation laws as a radical
departure from common law concepts of negligence).
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were the direct result of the employer's negligent acts.4 Moreover,
the employee was forced into the judicial forum with all the ac-
companying costs, delays, and uncertainties to compete against a
well-funded employer.5
As it became apparent that the judicial remedy acted too
harshly upon the injured worker, states began enacting workers'
compensation laws in the early twentieth century.' In creating
workers' compensation, states hoped to achieve a trilogy of objec-
tives. First, workers' compensation was designed to guarantee rea-
sonable income to the injured worker, regardless of fault.7 In es-
sence, this creates a form of strict liability where the employer is
charged with responsibility for workers' injuries that arise out of
employment without regard to comparative or other forms of negli-
gence.8 This effectively eliminates the old common law employer
defenses, such as contributory negligence, which served to bar em-
ployee recovery in tort." In exchange, the employer's liability for
the injury is strictly limited. The employer is not liable for any
punitive damages, and its liability for actual damages is often
fixed, depending on the type and severity of the injury.10 This
gives the employer predictability that it did not have under the
4. The practical result of this burden was that plaintiffs were denied recovery. See
Mark R. Whitmore, Note, Denying Scholarship Athletes Worker's Compensation: Do
Courts Punt Away a Statutory Right?, 76 IOWA L. REv. 763, 768 (1991) (noting that prior to
workers' compensation, 80% of all industrial accident claims failed or left the plaintiff
uncompensated).
5. See U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 2, at vi (characterizing the legal sys-
tem as slow, costly, and uncertain); Whitmore, supra note 4, at 768-69 (claiming plaintiffs'
difficulties in the courtroom stem from employers' tort defenses).
6. New York is credited as the first state to pass a workers' compensation statute. By
1921, all but a few states had enacted such laws. This swift adoption has led Professor
Keeton to proclaim that "no subject of labor legislation ever has made such progress or
received such general acceptance of its principles in so brief a period." W. PAGE KEETON ET
AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 80, at 573 (5th ed. 1984).
7. See ARTHUR LARSON, 1 THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 2.00-2.10 (1990)
(explaining the connection with workplace injury instead of fault as the test for compensa-
tion); U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 2, at vi (listing compensation regardless of
fault as the first main objective of workers' compensation); see generally AMERICAN LAW
INSTITUTE REPORTER'S STUDY, 1 ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY 105-127
(1991) [hereinafter ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY].
8. See Ronald G. Ehrenberg, Workers' Compensation, Wages and the Risk of Injury,
in NEW PERSPECTIVES IN WORKERS' COMPENSATION 71, 72 (John F. Burton, Jr. ed., 1988)
(characterizing workers' compensation as a form of no-fault insurance); KEETON, supra note
6, at 573 ("Workers' compensation is thus a form of strict liability.").
9. Professor Keeton colorfully describes these common law defenses as the "three
wicked sisters"-contributory negligence, assumption of risk, and the fellow servant doc-
trine. KEETON, supra note 6, at 573.
10. See infra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
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common law.
Just as workers' compensation seeks to guarantee recovery to
the injured worker as an important substantive objective, it is also
designed to pursue a vital procedural purpose. In addition to guar-
anteeing compensation, the system tries to provide this in a single,
efficient administrative remedy.1 This goal is paramount, since the
important substantive objective of workers' compensation fails if
the statute is poorly administered. 1'2
Safety enhancement is a third objective of workers' compensa-
tion. Workers' compensation affects workplace safety in two inde-
pendent ways. First, the reporting provisions of workers' compen-
sation statutes make employers aware of the specific employee
injuries. This identification encourages frank study of accident
causes and prevention."3 Further, since workers' compensation im-
poses the costs of employee accidents on the employer, the system
creates a financial incentive for the employer to prevent injuries."
Presumably, a firm makes safety decisions based upon the costs
and benefits of additional safety.'" Injury prevention and work-
place safety can thus be enhanced by placing predictable financial
responsibility for accidents on the employer.' e
B. The Mechanics of Workers' Compensation
To implement these three laudable goals, the states have cre-
ated their own independent workers' compensation statutes. While
each state's workers' compensation law has its own unique fea-
11. See U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 2, at vi (noting the objective of work-
ers' compensation as providing a single remedy to reduce court delays, costs, and workloads
found in time-consuming personal injury litigation); see generally JOSEPH W. LITTLE ET AL.,
WORKERS' COMPENSATION 399-418 (3d ed. 1993).
12. See LITTLE, supra note 11, at 399 (stressing the importance of administration in
achieving the goals of workers' compensation); U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 2, at
37 ("Without an effective delivery system, many of the problems associated with the com-
mon law and employer liability would remain.").
13. See LITTLE, supra note 11, at 405 (describing the notice provisions of workers'
compensation statutes as allowing employers the opportunity to investigate and mitigate
harm from accidents); U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 2, at 2 (highlighting how a
workers' compensation program promotes preventative services by insurance agencies, state
agencies, and employers).
14. RICHARD B. VICTOR ET AL., WORKERS' COMPENSATION AND WORKPLACE SAFETY: SOME
LESSONS FROM ECONOMIC THEORY V (1982).
15. See VICTOR, supra note 14, at vi (describing the conceptual framework that firms
make safety decisions based upon cost-benefit analysis).
16. See id. at vii (concluding as a general proposition that the conventional wisdom
that workers' compensation creates financial incentives for safety is correct); U.S. CHAMBER
OF COMMERCE, supra note 2, at 2 (arguing a second major role of workers' compensation is to
create a monetary incentive to employers to improve their safety records).
[Vol. 12:95
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tures, it is possible to identify commonalities. 17
1. Application to Employment Injuries
It is vital to identify what should be obvious at the outset.
Workers' compensation is designed to provide recovery solely for
work-related injuries and illnesses.18 The compensation program is
not intended to cover all health problems of the employee. 19 To
achieve this limitation, compensation statutes generally limit re-
covery to those injuries that "arise out of and in the course of em-
ployment. '20 While this language does not guarantee universal ap-
plication and coverage for all types of employee injuries,"1 it does
serve to limit and focus the remedy available. Moreover, unlike a
tort system of recovery, workers' compensation provides only for
the financial harms accompanying injury, not the pain and suffer-
ing of the injured worker.2 2
2. Quid Pro Quo and the Exclusive Remedy
It is not surprising that employers would not instinctively em-
brace a workers' compensation system unless it provided them
with an incentive. What has emerged is best described as a quid
pro quo. Employees are entitled to relatively swift and certain
compensation for their injuries without having to prove the em-
ployer was at fault. In exchange for this benefit, employees give up
their common law right to sue the employer in tort.2 By waiving
17. This brief explanation of the components of the workers' compensation system is
not intended to be comprehensive. Rather it is designed to highlight features of the system
that impact coverage of professional athletes. For a complete examination of workers' com-
pensation issues, consult the seminal multi-volume treatise by Professor Larson. See AR-
THUR LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION (1990).
18. See Whitmore, supra note 4, at 767 ("The main purpose of worker's compensation
laws is to provide employees a guaranteed remedy for injuries arising in the course of serv-
ing their employers."); U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 2, at 1 ("Another basic
objective for workers' compensation is to provide compensation for all work-related injuries
and diseases.").
19. U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 2, at 2.
20. See LARSON, supra note 7, § 6.10 (describing the "arising out of" test under work-
ers' compensation statutes); U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 2, at 2 ("Typically the
statute limits compensation benefits to 'personal injury caused by accidents arising out of
and in the course of employment.' "); see e.g., TEx. LAB. CODE ANN. § 406.031 (Vernon 1994)
(describing liability for compensation when the injury arises out of and in the course and
scope of employment).
21. This has particular importance for coverage of professional athletes. Some courts
have limited application of state workers' compensation by defining athletes' injuries as
non-accidents. See infra notes 66-73 and accompanying text.
22. ENTERPRISE RESPONSImITy, supra note 7, at 114.
23. See LARSON, supra note 7, § 65.11 (explaining the basic rule of exclusivity); John
1995]
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common law tort actions, workers' compensation becomes the ex-
clusive remedy for employee relief.2 4 This system is more advanta-
geous to the employee than a tort action for damages, since it pro-
vides fixed compensation on the happening of an injury during the
course of employment, without the onerous burdens of litigation."
Similarly, the employer benefits from tort immunity and the crea-
tion of statutorily-capped benefits.2
Complementing the exclusivity of remedy is often an anti-
waiver provision. This solidifies the bargain between employers
and employees, by prohibiting express waivers or contractual pro-
visions designed to compromise workers' rights under the system.
27
This is in recognition of the superior bargaining position of the
employer." The combination of exclusivity and anti-waiver provi-
sions places the issue of workers' compensation squarely before the
statutorily-created administrative agency.
D. Worrall & David Appel, Some Benefit Issues in Workers' Compensation, in WORKERS'
COMPENSATION BENEFITS: ADEQUACY, EQUITY, AND EFFICIENCY 1, 3 (John D. Worrall & David
Appel eds., 1985) (describing the system as a quid pro quo because employees get swift
payment and employers get immunity from suit); Whitmore, supra note 4, at 770-71 (noting
the trade-off as one of universal coverage and a cost of waiving tort suits and accepting the
statutory compensation); John F. Burton, Jr., Introduction, in NEW PERSPECTIVES IN WORK-
ERS' COMPENSATION 1, 23 (John F. Burton, Jr. ed., 1988) (describing the well-known quid pro
quo).
24. See Burton, supra note 23, at 23 ("The exclusiveness of the compensation remedy
is a universal feature of American compensation law."); 75 TEX. JUR. 3d Work Injury Com-
pensation § 83, at 168 (1991) (noting that generally coverage under the workers' compensa-
tion statute is the exclusive remedy). Some states even include exclusivity of remedy provi-
sions in the statute itself. See e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 22-3-2-6 (Burns 1992) (citing that
rights and remedies of employees are exclusive under workers' compensation statute); TEx.
LAB. CODE ANN. § 408.001(a) (Vernon 1994) ("Recovery of workers' compensation benefits is
the exclusive remedy of an employee covered by workers' compensation insurance coverage
25. See 75 TEx. JUR. 3d Work Injury Compensation § 10, at 48-49 (1991) (describing
the advantages of the program to employees).
26. See Whitmore, supra note 4, at 770-71 (assessing the benefits to the employer).
27. See LITrLE, supra note 11, at 413 (describing how many state statutes specifically
prohibit waiver of rights); see e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 22-3-2-15 (Burns 1992) (prohibiting
contracts, agreements, whether written or implied, rules or other devices from relieving the
employer of obligations under the statute); N.Y. WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW § 33 (Mc-
Kinney 1993) (prohibiting assignment or release of compensation or benefits); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 85 § 47 (West 1992) ("No agreement by an employee to waive his right to compen-
sation under this act shall be valid."); TEX. LAB. CODE ANN § 406.035 (Vernon 1994) ("Ex-
cept as provided by this subtitle, an agreement by an employee to waive the employee's
right to compensation is void."); WASH. REV. CODE § 51.04.060 (West 1990) ("No employer
or worker shall exempt himself or herself from the burden or waive the benefits of this title
by any contract, agreement, rule or regulation, and any such contract, agreement, rule or
regulation shall be pro tanto void.").
28. See LITTLE, supra note 11, at 413 (categorizing anti-waiver provisions as rooted in
concern for employer exploitation).
[Vol. 12:95
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3. Creation of an Administrative Agency
Facilitating the exclusivity of remedy is an administrative
agency2" to process claims and resolve disputes surrounding work-
ers' compensation. The administrative agency strives to ensure
that both employers and employees are aware of their rights and
obligations and comply with the system.30 This role is vital since
most workers' compensation claims are uncontested.3 1 Addition-
ally, the agency keeps accident records and compiles data and sta-
tistics useful in tracking the progress of improved workplace
safety.3 2 The agency must also conduct the daily supervision of
compensation awards, often over long periods of time. Finally,
workers' compensation boards are the forum for resolution of
disputes.3
The advantages of an administrative remedy, as opposed to a
judicial one, are clear. Courts are not equipped to handle the day
to day issues of workers' compensation efficiently. They simply
lack the resources to perform the many tasks required to ensure
prompt claim processing, payment, continuous follow-up, statisti-
cal compilation, and the like. 3 ' Even in the area of contested cases,
administrative resolution is superior. The use of informal and ex-
peditious administrative procedures encourages prompt resolution
of disputes. 5 This is enhanced by the extensive experience of the
workers' compensation boards in handling disputes. Consequently,
29. These administrative agencies have a myriad of different names. Arizona has an
Industrial Commission. Kentucky uses a Workers' Compensation Board. Massachusetts has
a Department of Industrial Accidents. Texas has a Workers' Compensation Commission.
Despite the name, each agency serves the same functions. For a complete list of each of
these state workers' compensation agencies, see U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 2,
at 55 (Chart XVI: Directory of Administrators).
30. See LITTLE, supra note 11, at 399 (listing the main purpose of administrative agen-
cies as informational); U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 2, at 37 (describing a princi-
pal area of administration as supervision of compliance with statutory requirements).
31. See LITTLE, supra note 11, at 402 ("In 70 to 90 percent of the cases of work-con-
nected injury or disease, liability is not disputed either as to matters of fact or questions of
law.").
32. U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 2, at 37 (listing collection of data and
evaluation as a principal administrative area).
33. See LITTLE, supra note 11, at 399 (identifying additional functions of the adminis-
trative agency under workers' compensation laws).
34. See id. at 400 (claiming that court administration is inferior to agency administra-
tion because courts are not equipped to handle all aspects of workers' compensation
effectively).
35. See ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 7, at 118 (indicating that specialized
administrative tribunals resolve workers' compensation issues more informally, expedi-
tiously and economically); LrrTLE, supra note 11, at 404 (noting the superiority of adminis-
trative agencies in resolving contested issues).
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workers' compensation through an administrative agency is both
faster and cheaper than litigation." Not surprisingly, the judicial
role in workers' compensation is generally limited to appellate re-
view of the record to ensure proper application of the law to the
facts."7 In so doing, the courts generally pay great deference to the
expertise and discretion of the administrative factfinder35
4. Benefit Classification Scheme
A final common characteristic of workers' compensation is a
benefit classification scheme. Worker injuries are carefully classi-
fied and compensated according to the type of injury and the bene-
fit sought. Typically, claims made by injured workers fall into four
distinct categories.3 9
First, there are temporary disability benefits. These most fre-
quently comprise temporary total disability claims,"° but tempo-
rary partial disability benefits are often provided for as well. Tem-
porary disability claims result from injuries that, in the short term,
prevent the employee from being able to work but from which full
recovery and return to employment is expected. 41 There is often a
waiting period prior to receiving temporary benefits.42 The benefit
itself is usually specified as a fraction of preinjury earnings, com-
monly two-thirds.43 These benefits are designed to compensate the
injured worker for the income stream lost during the temporary
disability.
A second component of the compensation scheme is the im-
pairment benefit. These are designed to compensate for permanent
partial or total disabilities. Unlike temporary benefits, these are
designed to compensate the injured employee for injuries that are
expected to result in some permanent physical impairment, limita-
36. See ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 7, at 119 ("Nevertheless, at least in
aggregate terms WC is an administratively faster and cheaper system than tort litigation.").
37. See LrrrLE, supra note 11, at 412 (describing the limits of judicial review in most
states).
38. See LIrFLE, supra note 11, at 412.
39. See generally Ehrenberg, supra note 8, at 72-74 (describing different categories of
benefits); Worrall & Appel, supra note 23, at 4-6.
40. Temporary total disability claims are by far the most frequent type of claim. Eh-
renberg, supra note 8, at 73; U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 2, at 20.
41. Worrall & Appel, supra note 23, at 4.
42. For a comparison of waiting periods see U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 2,
at 32 (Chart IX: Waiting Period for Income/Medical Benefits).
43. See C. Arthur Williams, Jr., Minimum Weekly Workers' Compensation Benefits,
in WORKERS' COMPENSATION BENEFITS: ADEQUACY, EQurrY, AND EFFICIENCY 89, 90 (John D.
Worrall & David Appel eds., 1985) (describing the operation of disability payments); Ehren-
berg, supra note 8, at 72 (claiming the common benefit is set at two-thirds).
[Vol. 12:95
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tion, or loss of earning capacity." Total disability benefits are
often calculated in a fashion similar to temporary benefits.
Calculation of partial impairment benefits is divided into
"scheduled" and "nonscheduled" disabilities.4 In the case of a
scheduled injury, state law specifically lists a maximum amount
payable for the loss of use of a specific body member.4 With non-
scheduled injuries, states often base compensation on a wage-loss
replacement percentage.47 Some state schemes calculate partial
disabilities using an impairment rating-the percentage of perma-
nent impairment of the whole body from the compensable injury.48
Regardless of the method of benefit calculation, there is an in-
herent difference between temporary benefits and impairment
compensation. Temporary benefits do not address the actual phys-
ical injury, but instead are designed to compensate the injured
worker for current income lost during recovery. On the other hand,
impairment benefits for permanent partial or total disability pro-
vide purely prospective relief. They compensate the injured worker
for the future loss of bodily functions and wage earning capacity.
49
This critical distinction highlights the means by which workers'
compensation strives to provide the injured worker with not only
temporary compensation pending rehabilitation, but also prospec-
tive compensation for the permanent loss of earning capacity.50
A third benefit category provides for the payment of medical
expenses related to the injury. These are often unlimited and in-
tended to encourage the physical recovery of the worker.51 A final
benefit category of most compensation schemes is death benefits.
These are claims arising from fatal injuries or diseases. Commonly,
44. See Worrall & Appel, supra note 23, at 4-5 (describing permanent disability pay-
ments); Ehrenberg, supra note 8, at 72-73 (distinguishing temporary and permanent disabil-
ity payments).
45. See U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 2, at 20.
46. For a concise comparison of scheduled benefit calculations see U.S. CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE, supra note 2, at 27 (Chart VII: Income Benefits of Scheduled Injuries).
47. U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 2, at 20.
48. See 75 TEx. JUR. 3d Work Injury Compensation § 246, at 554 (1991) (explaining
impairment ratings).
49. See Gerald Herz & Robert C. Baker, Jr., Professional Athletes and the Law of
Workers' Compensation: Rights and Remedies, in LAW OF PROFESSIONAL AND AMATEUR
SPORTS 15-1, 15-17, at § 15.04 (Gary A. Uberstine ed., 1991) (explaining the prospective
nature of permanent disability payments and contrasting with temporary ones).
50. As discussed in detail below, this distinction is critical when considering the issue
of statutory and contractual set-offs of benefits by professional team owners against previ-
ously-paid salary. See infra notes 148-159 and accompanying text.
51. See Worrall & Appel, supra note 23, at 4 ("Workers' compensation provides for
virtually unlimited payment of medical benefits.").
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both burial and survival benefits are available. 52 Generally, these
claims account for only a small share of the workers' compensation
scheme."'
III. INTERPLAY BETWEEN WORKERS' COMPENSATION AND THE
PROFESSIONAL ATHLETE
In contrast to the other employees, workers' compensation im-
pacts the professional athlete in two distinct ways. First, state
workers' compensation statutes vary greatly in their specific treat-
ment of professional athletes. Subpart A examines these statutory
distinctions. Beyond statutory differences, a second major influ-
ence affects the athlete. The professional athlete's employment
contract with the team often includes specific provisions concern-
ing workers' compensation. These are the subject of subpart B. As
shown below, owners have tried to use both of these devices to
limit the athlete's ability to collect benefits. It is the opinion of the
authors that such limitations are inherently unfair and grounded
in meritless arguments."
A. Statutory Treatment of Professional Athletes
There are five basic ways states handle professional athletes
and workers' compensation. Despite this comprehensive treatment,
workers' compensation in general, and pro athlete treatment in
specific, is a very frequent target of legislative change. Conse-
quently, new methods of coverage could emerge in any legislative
session. Thus, the practitioner must be ever mindful that the com-
pensation law is only as valid as the latest legislative session up-
date or appellate court decision.
1. Silence
While many states have specific statutory provisions concern-
ing professional athletes,5 5 the vast majority of states do not in-
clude separate provisions for athletes. In the absence of special
provisions, courts56 and commentators57 alike correctly presume
52. See Worrall & Appel, supra note 23, at 5 (describing death benefits).
53. See Worrall & Appel, supra note 23, at 5.
54. See infra Part IV.
55. See infra subsections III(A)(2)-(5).
56. See infra notes 59-65 and accompanying text.
57. See Herz & Baker, supra note 49, at § 15.02[1] ("Generally, there is no dispute
that professional athletes employed by professional athletic clubs are employees and that
their injuries are compensable."); JOHN C. WEisTARdT & Cym H. LOWELL, THE LAW OF SPORTS
[Vol. 12:95
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professional athletes are included under state workers' compensa-
tion programs. Professor Larson illustrates the extent of this pre-
sumption when he proclaims that "[i]njuries in such sports are so
routinely treated as compensable in the great majority of jurisdic-
tions that they seldom appear in reported appellate decisions." 8
When courts are called upon to determine the applicability of
workers' compensation to the professional athlete, they routinely
find the statute covers the injury. Bayless v. Philadelphia Na-
tional League Club"9 is illustrative. Patrick Bayless sued the Phila-
delphia Phillies National League Baseball Club for personal inju-
ries he suffered while employed as a pitcher in the Phillies minor
league farm system. 0 Rather than filing a workers' compensation
claim, Bayless brought a common law tort action against the club.
The club responded, contending that Bayless, as the club's em-
ployee, fell within the ambit of workers' compensation, and was
thus, barred from prosecuting his suit." Bayless argued that the
Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act did not apply to
"high priced athletes. ' 62 In rejecting this contention the court
opined that the Act applied to "all employees regardless of their
earnings." 6 If Bayless were precluded, "then hundreds and possi-
bly thousands of low as well as high priced athletes on Major and
Minor League Teams would be deprived of the humanitarian bene-
fits and protection the Act provides."6 The court concluded that a
professional baseball team is a business operating for profit or gain
within the meaning of the compensation act. This presumption of
inclusion is generally confirmed by other courts that have consid-
§ 8.13, at 1009 (1979) ("It seems clear that an athlete who is a member of a professional
athletic team will frequently be an 'employee' for purposes of the workmen's compensation
statutes, except in those jurisdictions where professional athletes are specifically excluded
from coverage."); 82 AM. JUR. 2d Workers' Compensation § 137 (1991) ("Professional sports
may be considered businesses subjecting employers to workers' compensation provisions in
some instances."); Workers' Compensation Business Management Guide (CCH) 3775
(1993) ("Professional sports injuries arise in the course of employment.").
58. LARSON, supra note 7, § 22.21(b).
59. 472 F. Supp. 625 (E.D. Pa. 1979), aff'd, 615 F.2d 1352 (3d Cir. 1980).
60. Bayless, 472 F. Supp. at 627.
61. Id. It is ironic that now team owners are attempting to limit their players' benefits
by having them determined under workers' compensation statutes (and thus limited by the
imposed compensation barriers) and then suing in court to recover these benefits under a
theory of breach of the contractual provisions calling for setoff discussed below. See Dallas
Cowboys Football Club, Ltd. v. Banks, No. 94-00247-J, now pending before the 191st Judi-
cial District Court of Dallas County, Texas.
62. Bayless, 472 F. Supp. at 631.
63. Id.
64. Id.
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ered the issue. 5
While there is a consensus for inclusion of professional ath-
letes in workers' compensation programs, there is some contrary
authority that athletes do not fall within the ambit of the system.
The seminal expression of this erroneous point of view is Palmer
v. Kansas City Chiefs Football Club.6 7 Gery Palmer was an offen-
sive guard employed by the Kansas City Chiefs. He was injured
during the course of a scheduled game when a defensive lineman
pushed him into an "off balance posture."8 The Missouri Indus-
trial Commission awarded Palmer compensation for his back in-
jury based upon a determination that the injury was the result of
an abnormal strain. 9 The court of appeals reversed rejecting the
concept that the injury was "abnormal." The court found the off
balance posture was "not an unexpected occupational event, but
rather as customary as not. ' 70 The court further slammed the door
on athlete compensation when it concluded that the enactment of
the state workers' compensation program "simply does not con-
template that the deliberate collision of bodies constitutes an acci-
dent or that injury in the usual course of such an occupation is
caused by an unexpected event. '71 While at least one other inter-
65. See Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co. of New York v. Huhn, 141 S.E. 121, 125-26
(Ga. 1928) (holding a professional baseball player is covered under the state workers' com-
pensation act); McGlasson v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board, 557 A.2d 841, 841-43
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1989) (affirming a workers' compensation award to a Philadelphia Eagles
player who suffered a career ending injury); Brinkman v. Buffalo Bills Football Club, 433 F.
Supp. 699, 702 (W.D.N.Y. 1977) (holding that a workers' compensation claim is the exclu-
sive remedy for a football player injured during play); Knelson v. Meadowlanders, Inc., 732
P.2d 808, 810, 814 (Kan. Ct. App. 1987) (affirming a workers' compensation award for a
professional hockey player); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of N.
Am., 271 F.2d 955, 956 (5th Cir. 1959) (affirming a district court finding that the Texas
workers' compensation system applies to professional baseball players). Note that the Kan-
sas position is now confirmed by the statute as well. See infra notes 75-77 and accompany-
ing text. The Texas position has been altered by the new elective procedure. See infra notes
92-98 and accompanying text.
66. The Palmer decision has been roundly criticized. Professor Larson has been espe-
cially vocal in his disdain for the reasoning of the court. See LARSON, supra note 7,
§ 22.21(b) (criticizing the Palmer decision and its fallacious reasoning); Workers' Compensa-
tion Business Management Guide (CCH) 3775 (1993) (outlining criticisms). This article
will consider the fallacies surrounding judicial restriction of workers' compensation in sub-
parts IV(A)-(B).
67. 621 S.W.2d 350 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981).
68. Palmer, 621 S.W.2d at 352. For a more complete description of how Palmer was
bested by his opponent, Larry Hand, see 621 S.W.2d at 352-54.
69. Id. at 352.
70. Id. at 356.
71. Id. Missouri now deals with the professional athlete directly with its workers' com-
pensation statute. See infra note 100 and accompanying text.
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mediate appellate court has been swayed by the Palmer opinion,'7
the majority position is for inclusion of professional athletes under
the workers' compensation system.7
2. Statutory Inclusion
An alternative to judicial determination of workers' compensa-
tion coverage is direct statutory treatment of professional ath-
letes.7 4 Statutory inclusion is one option. Kansas, for example,
72. See Rowe v. Baltimore Colts, 454 A.2d 872, 878 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1983). The
Rowe panel concluded that a "professional football player is engaged in an occupation in
which physical contact with others is not only expected, commonplace, and usual, but is a
requirement." Id. The court then held:
Whenever a person engages in an occupation requiring violent physical contact
with others similarly inclined, he must expect that injury may arise therefrom.
Therefore, we hold that an injury sustained by a professional football player as
the result of legitimate and usual physical contact with other players, whether
under actual or simulated game conditions, cannot be said to be an "accidental
injury" within the meaning of the Maryland Workmen's Compensation Law.
Id. (citing Palmer).
73. See supra notes 58-65 and accompanying text. But see WALTER T. CHAMPION, JR.,
FUNDAMENTALS OF SPORTS LAW § 14.1, at 260 (1990) (claiming the approach in Rowe is prob-
ably the way other states courts would interpret state workers' compensation statutes and
professional athletes). While the majority position is that workers' compensation applies,
the injury still must be one arising out of employment. See Wilson v. Detroit Hockey Club,
Inc, 483 N.Y.S.2d 819 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984), aff'd, 489 N.E.2d 252 (N.Y. 1985). In Wilson, a
coach for the Adirondack Red Wings, a Detroit Hockey Club farm team, died while jogging
near his home during the off season. The court reversed a death benefit award on the
grounds that maintaining good physical condition was not a condition of his employment.
Wilson, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 820.
74. Whenever workers' compensation statutes deal directly with professional athletes,
there is a definitional problem. Most statutes use the term "professional athlete," yet offer
no definition whatsoever. See e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44.508(1)(b) (1993) (including profes-
sional athletes in the definition of workers, but offering no definition); LA. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 1225(D) (West Supp. 1994) (providing a set-off of workers' compensation benefits for pro-
fessional athletes without defining 'professional athlete'); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 418.360
(West 1985) (denying benefits to professional athletes with salaries greater than 200% of the
state average weekly wage, yet failing to define 'professional athlete'); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 287.270 (Vernon 1993) (providing full credit to employers of professional athletes for con-
tract benefits paid without defining professional athlete concept).
When states do try to define the term they often fair no better. Consider the limited
definition adopted by the Texas legislature. Their workers' compensation program requires
election by professional athletes. The statute defines professional athlete as one employed
by the National Football League, National Basketball Association, American League of Pro-
fessional Baseball Clubs, or the National League of Professional Baseball Clubs. TEx. LAB.
CODE ANN. § 406.095(c) (Vernon 1994). While they hit the big ones, apparently the recent
additions of professional hockey and soccer teams escaped their drafting. This leaves the
anomalous result that the provision applies to some professional athletes and not others.
Ensuring that no such anomaly occurs in Florida, their statute uses a broad brush to
ensure inclusion. The law imposes restrictions on "professional athletes." Just in case one
wonders who is included it elaborates that the pool includes "boxers, wrestlers, baseball,
football, basketball, hockey, polo, tennis, jai ala, and similar players, and motorsports teams
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makes their workers' compensation program applicable to profes-
sional athletes. The Kansas law defines "workman or employee or
worker" as "any person who has entered into the employment of or
works under any contract of service or apprenticeship with an em-
ployer." 5 Leaving no doubt about the role of the athlete, the stat-
ute continues: "Such terms shall include but not be limited to...
professional athletes .... ,,76 Hence, the statute codifies workers'
compensation protection for athletes.71
3. Statutory Exclusion
In contrast to the Kansas approach, some states, lobbied heav-
ily by sports team owners, have excluded professional athletes
from their workers' compensation programs.7 This often takes the
form of a blanket exclusion as found in the Florida statute .7 In
defining the coverage of the workers' compensation program, the
Florida statute states that employment does not include service
performed by professional athletes.80 Despite the general concept
.... .FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.02(15)(c)(3) (West 1991).
This is by no means an exhaustive list of possible definitions. Some talk in terms of
employees of "professional sports franchise." See OHi REV. CODE ANN § 4123.56(C) (Ander-
son Supp. 1993). Others speak in terms of "organized professional athletics." See e.g., MASS.
ANN. LAWS ch. 152, § 1(4) (Law. Co-op 1989); W. VA. CODE § 23-2-1(b)(6) (1993). This com-
parison of statutory definitions illustrates yet another problem encountered when states try
to restrict workers' compensation benefits from a certain class of employees.
75. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44.508(1)(b) (1993).
76. Id.
77. The Kansas courts are in accord. See Knelson v. Meadowlanders, 732 P.2d 808
(Kan. Ct. App. 1987) (affirming a workers compensation award to an injured hockey player).
Kansas is not the only state making specific provisions for pro athlete coverage. New York,
while silent on general application to professional athletes, makes a special provision for the
inclusion of jockeys in their workers' compensation program. See N.Y. WORKERS' COMPENSA-
TION LAW § 2 (McKinney 1993) (defining "employee" to include jockeys).
78. See CHAMPION, supra note 73, at 257 ("Some states, for example, are so uncivilized
that they specifically exclude professional athletes from coverage.").
79. Florida is not alone in excluding athletes from their workers' compensation pro-
gram. See also MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 152, § 1(4)(B) (Law Co-op 1989) (excepting profes-
sional athletes from coverage). Rather than having a blanket exclusion, some states specifi-
cally exclude certain professional athletes. Rhode Island takes this approach with
professional hockey players. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-29-15 (Supp. 1993) (exempting profes-
sional ice hockey players, coaches and trainers employed by a professional ice hockey club,
including but not limited to National Hockey League and American Hockey League). Wash-
ington excludes professional jockeys. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 51.12.020 (West Supp.
1994) (excluding jockeys participating in or preparing horses for race meets). Other coun-
tries sometimes pursue similar exclusions. See Hayden Opie & Graham F. Smith, Profes-
sional Team Sports and Employment Law in Australia: From Individualism to Collective
Labor Relations?, 2 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 211, 223 (1992) (describing the general exclusion of
professional athletes from the Australian workers' compensation system).
80. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.02(15)(c)(3) (West 1991).
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of universal coverage associated with workers' compensation, Flor-
ida courts have upheld this express statutory limitation.8 1 Even
when confronted with constitutional challenges, the statute has
thus far been upheld. In holding the exclusion does not violate the
equal protection provision of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Florida Court of Appeals found that the provision bore a reasona-
ble relationship to the legislative purpose.8 2
Statutory exclusions can create difficult issues in their applica-
tion. Again Florida is illustrative. While the Florida statute specifi-
cally denies coverage to professional athletes, the judiciary has
balked at consistent application. Consider Miles v. Montreal Base-
ball Club.s 3 Arthur Miles, a professional baseball player with the
Montreal Expos' organization was injured while attending a press
party under Club directive. Instead of being interviewed, Miles
dove into the Intercoastal Waterway and struck bottom; he was
paralyzed." The judge of industrial claims denied workers' com-
pensation under the Florida statute. The appellate court re-
versed. 5 The court posited an intriguing dichotomy. Initially, they
noted that had Miles been injured while playing baseball, his occu-
pation, he would be denied coverage under the statute. However,
the press party was not the "'kind of work or labor associated
with' playing baseball, but an additional activity imposed upon
him by the employer and to the employer's substantial benefit."8 6
Consequently, Miles was entitled to workers' compensation bene-
fits despite the language of the statutory exclusion. The end result
in Florida is that a professional athlete is not covered by workers'
compensation when he is engaged in his primary occupation, how-
81. See Rudolph v. Miami Dolphins, Ltd., 447 So. 2d 284 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983)
(affirming the exclusion of a professional football player from the workers' compensation
program).
82. See Rudolph, 447 So. 2d at 291
("We cannot say that the legislature's exclusion of this voluntary, though highly
dangerous, activity from the worker's compensation act fails to bear some rea-
sonable relationship to a legitimate state purpose and is so completely arbitrary
and lacking in equality of application to all persons similarly situated as to vio-
late the cited constitutional provisions.").
The Rudolph opinion is the only judicial discussion addressing the constitutionality of a
professional athlete exclusion. The only other court which had the opportunity to address
the issue declined on procedural grounds. See Ohio v. Cincinnati Bengals, No. 92AP-1273,
1993 WL 271011, at *7 (Ohio Ct. App. July 15, 1993).
83. 379 So. 2d 1325 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
84. Miles, 379 So. 2d at 1325-26.
85. Id. at 1326.
86. Id.
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ever, he may be covered when participating in ancillary activities.8 7
Aside from blanket exclusion, a separate way of restricting ac-
cess to workers' compensation is through functional exclusion.
Michigan takes this approach. Unlike Florida, Michigan does not
specifically define athlete labor out of coverage. Instead, the Michi-
gan statute proclaims that a person who suffers an injury arising
out of and in the course of employment as a professional athlete
shall be entitled to weekly benefits. 8 However, the statute then
restricts coverage to only those athletes making less than 200% of
the state weekly wage.89 Comparing the current average weekly
wage with average professional athlete salaries (and virtually any
other professional salary), this amounts to functional exclusion."
4. Election Method
An alternative method of restricting access of professional ath-
letes to workers' compensation is through an election method. This
approach takes two forms. In West Virginia, employers engaged in
"organized professional sports" are not required to subscribe to the
workers' compensation fund, but they may elect to participate.91
By contrast, the Texas scheme allows the athlete to make the
election. Professional athletes in the National Football League,
National Basketball Association, and major league baseball have
the option to receive either benefits under the workers' compensa-
tion system or injury benefits under their contract or collective
bargaining agreement.92 The injured athlete must make the elec-
87. This result has not escaped the eyes of other commentators. See LARSON, supra
note 7, § 22.21(b), at 5-105 (describing the paradox of denying compensation to athletes
doing their job, but compensating Miles).
88. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 418.360 (West 1985).
89. Id.
90. Michigan's state average weekly wage for 1995 was $554.22. The average salary for
an N.F.L. player is approximately $650.000. See Bill Brubaker, In NFL Supplements Com-
plement with Steroids Banned, Some Players Turn to Pills, Powders to Get Ahead, THE
WASH. POST, Jan. 22, 1995, at dl; Michael Wilbon, Redskins a Bit Confused on Dues and
Don'ts, THE WASH. POST, Dec. 26, 1993, at dl. The average salary for a professional baseball
player is nearly $1.2 million per year. See Mark Maske, Baseball Feels Some Optimism,
Bargaining Resumes with Season at Stake, THE WASH. POST, Sept. 8, 1994, at al; Christine
Brennan, No Longer Fun and Games, Sports is Labor, THE WASH. POST, Aug. 24, 1994, at
cl. The average salary for an N.B.A. player is $1.6 million. See Leon Hochberg, NHL Re-
jects Proposal, THE WASH. POST, Oct. 12, 1994, at bl. The average salary for an N.H.L.
player is $525,000. See Michael Wilbon, The Puck Stops Where?, THE WASH. POST, Sept.
22, 1994, at bl.
91. W. VA. CODE § 22-2-1(b)(6) (1993).
92. Tix. LAB. CODE ANN. § 406.095 (Vernon 1994).
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tion within 15 days of the injury."3 The right to accept contract
benefits is contingent upon the contract benefits being equal to or
greater than benefits available under workers' compensation. 4
Despite the election feature, the Texas statute is designed to
take athletes out of the workers' compensation program. The
Texas provision was originally adopted in 1991. The original bill
exempted professional athletes from the system altogether pro-
vided they had equivalent contract benefits.9 5 The proposed stat-
ute would have allowed voluntary coverage by employers, however,
benefits paid to athletes would then be subject to dollar reductions
for any contract injury benefits paid.96 The House bill analysis re-
flects their motivation. "The purpose of the bill is to add athletes
serving under contract for hire or collective bargaining agreement
to the list of employees . ..exempted from the act in order to
reduce expenses of major league sports franchises. 1' 7 While the ul-
timate bill passed by the legislature did not completely exempt
athletes, the version adopted was forged in an environment of hos-
tility to athlete coverage.es The end result is a type of functional
exclusion of coverage whenever contract benefits are greater than
workers' compensation benefits.
5. Set-Off States
The most recent attack upon professional athletes' workmen's
compensation coverage is through the use of a set-off. Under this
method, athletes are covered by workers' compensation, but em-
ployee benefits are reduced on a dollar for dollar basis by any con-
tract benefits paid to the injured athlete. The most recent state to
93. The Texas Workers' Compensation Commission has established both the time pe-
riod for notice and the wording of employer notification. See 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 112.401
(West 1994) (Tex. Workers' Compensation Comm'n).
94. Tax. LAB. CODE ANN. § 406.095(a) (Vernon 1994). See also HOWARD L. NATIONS &
JOHN C. KILPRATRICK, TEXAS WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW § 2.21[6] (1994) (describing the
election procedure for professional athletes). The Texas Workers' Compensation Commis-
sion has established rules to determine whether benefits under contract are equivalent. See
28 Tax. ADMIN. CODE § 112.402 (West 1994) (explaining the determination of equivalent
benefits for professional athletes). For example, medical benefits would not be considered
equal if the employer's liability for health care is limited or terminated in any way by the
contract or collective bargaining agreement. See id. § 112.402(a)(2).
95. See Tex. S.B. 428, 72nd Leg., R.S. (1991).
96. Id.
97. HousE COMM. ON BUSINESS AND COMMERCE, BILL ANALYSIS, Tex. S.B. 428, 72nd
Leg., R.S. (1991).
98. For a concise treatment of the issues surrounding passage of the bill, see HOUSE
RESEARCH ORGANIZATION, BILL ANALYSIS, S.B. 428 (May 22, 1991) (comparing arguments in
favor and in opposition of passage).
1995]
17
Carlin and Fairman: Squeeze Play: Workers' Compensation and the Professional Athlete
Published by Institutional Repository, 1995
ENTERTAINMENT & SPORTS LAW REVIEW
adopt the set-off approach is Louisiana. In 1993, the Louisiana leg-
islature adopted a provision that compensation benefits payable to
the professional athlete are to be reduced on a dollar for dollar
basis if the injured athlete receives any wages or benefits." Mis-
souri uses the set-off to allow employers of professional athletes to
take full credit for wages or benefits paid to the employee after
injury.100 Ohio combines the Louisiana and Missouri approaches.
First, any payment under contract of hire is deemed an advanced
payment of workers' compensation benefits.10 1 Then the employer
is reimbursed for the total amount of payments out of any award
of compensation. 10 2 The end result is to reduce the benefits of a
professional athlete by the amount the player received while under
contract.
B. Contract Restrictions
Legislative restrictions on professional athletes' workers' com-
pensation benefits are not the only issue in universal coverage.
Player contracts and collective bargaining agreements can also
sometimes affect access to benefits. For example, it has been held
that where a contract calls for benefits greater than the minimum
statutory injury benefits, the owners cannot rely on the lesser stat-
utory standard as a means of providing less than the contract re-
quires. 03 Thus, the negotiations and terms of player contracts
takes on greater significance. Here, four major agreements are
considered.
1. National Football League
Professional football is the most important area for workers'
99. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 1225(D) (West Supp. 1994). The Louisiana law is sweeping
in its coverage. It applies to benefits payable under any provision of workers' compensation.
Likewise benefits are reduced by virtually any payment. The statute lists: any wages or
benefits, collective bargaining agreement, contract, severance pay, injured reserve pay, ter-
mination pay, grievance or settlement pay, worker's compensation benefit, or "[a]ny other
payment made to the professional athlete by the employer pursuant to any contract or
agreement whatsoever." Id.
100. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 287.270 (Vernon 1993) ("[E]mployers of professional athletes
under contract shall be entitled to full credit for wages or benefits paid to the employee
after the injury including medical, surgical or hospital benefits paid to or for the employee
or his dependents on account of the injury, disability, or death, pursuant to the provisions
of the contract.").
101. Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 4123.45(C) (Anderson Supp. 1993).
102. Id.
103. Tampa Bay Area NFL Football, Inc. v. Jarvis, No. 94-3411, 1996 WL 20865, at
*1-2 (FI Dist. Ct. App. Jan. 23, 1996).
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compensation claims for two reasons. Initially, more workers' com-
pensation claims occur with pro football players than other ath-
letes. 1°4 Additionally, football players are often occupationally in-
jured,10 5 ensuring workers' compensation benefits in most states.106
Consequently, examination of the NFL Player Contract is a good
springboard for analysis.
Two provisions of the standard NFL Player Contract might
affect workers' compensation. Paragraph 9 relates to the Club's re-
sponsibility for contract payment after injury. If the player is in-
jured, the club must pay "such medical and hospital care during
the term of this contract as the Club physician may deem neces-
sary. 1 0 7 In addition, the Club will continue to pay the yearly sal-
ary to the player during the season of injury only and for no subse-
quent period.108
Paragraph 10 deals directly with workers' compensation.
Under this provision,
[a]ny compensation paid to the Player under this contract or
under any collective bargaining agreement in existence during
the term of this contract for a period during which he is entitled
to temporary total, permanent total, temporary partial, or per-
manent partial disability will be deemed an advance payment of
workmen's compensation benefits due Player, and Club will be
entitled to be reimbursed the amount of such payment out of
any award of workmen's compensation. 10 9
The combination of these contractual provisions yields the fol-
lowing result. The injured professional football player is compen-
sated for the remaining season. Following the season of injury, the
Club has no contractual obligation to continue salary payments. If
104. See PAUL C. WEELER & GARY R. ROBERTS, SPORTS AND THE LAW 740 (1993) (noting
that football has been the main contributor of workers' compensation claims).
105. See Timothy K. Smith, Players Charge NFL with Trying End Run on Disability
Benefits, WALL ST. J., Dec. 7, 1992, at Al (arguing 65% of retiring football players leave
with some kind of permanent disability); Kevin B. Blackistone, Byrd's Paralysis Spotlights
NFL's Poor Disability Plan, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Dec. 20 1992, at 4B (citing a Ball State
University report that 72% of pro football players now suffer injuries requiring surgery).
Some estimates claim that all professional football players will sustain a serious compensa-
ble injury. WARREN FREEDMAN, THE LAW AND OCCUPATIONAL INJURY, DISEASE, AND DEATH 9
(1990) (claiming all will sustain an injury); Workers' Comp: More Athletes Seek Benefits,
TRIAL, June 1988, at 87 (citing National Football League Players Association statistics that
indicate every player will sustain an injury).
106. See supra notes 55-65 and accompanying text (noting presumed inclusion of
athletes).
107. Paragraph 9, NFL Player Contract.
108. Id.
109. Paragraph 10, NFL Player Contract.
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the player receives any workers' compensation benefits, a club
might try to argue that it is entitled to reimbursement.110
However, workers' compensation boards that have correctly
construed this contractual language have properly limited its ap-
plication such as occurred in Harty v. San Francisco 49ers.11' John
Harty injured his right foot in 1983 and his left foot in 1986, while
employed as a professional football player for the San Francisco
49ers. The 49ers organization sought credit for any disability bene-
fit due to Harty. The California Workers' Compensation Appeals
Board rejected this interpretation of the contract provision. Focus-
ing on the language of Paragraph 10, the appeals board noted the
provision applied to any compensation paid to the player "for a
period" during which he is entitled to benefits. The board stressed
that
[t]he parties inclusion of the phrase for a period, for which com-
pensation is paid to player, at a time when the player is entitled
to temporary disability and permanent disability, clearly indi-
cates that the parties intended that the employer's credit ap-
plied only to periods that compensation is paid for under the
contract, and at the same time there is liability for workers'
compensation benefits." 2
The well-reasoned rationale behind this interpretation was to pre-
vent double payment for a single injury.113 Consequently, the ap-
peals board found that only Harty's 1983 and 1986 salaries were
subject to credit and only by those benefits due during the same
period of time as a result of the two injuries.
Because of the "for a period" language of Paragraph 10, work-
ers' compensation boards also correctly limit the applicability of
set-off to temporary benefits only. Consider the District of Colum-
bia worker's compensation decision of Wonsley v. Pro Football,
110. See Pittsburgh Steelers Sports, Inc. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board
(Erenberg), 604 A.2d 319 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1992), pet. for allowance of appeal denied, 609
A.2d 170 (Pa. 1992). This case involved the Pittsburgh Steelers' appeal of an order of the
Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board granting benefits to former player Richard M. Er-
enberg. The Steelers' organization sought credit against those benefits for $65,000 paid
under the injury protection payment provisions of the collective bargaining agreement. Id.
at 321. Reading the injury protection payment terms of the collective bargaining agreement
in pari materia with Paragraph 10, the court held that the $65,000 payment was in lieu of
workmen's compensation. Id. at 323. Consequently, the Steelers were held to be entitled to a
massive 180 week credit for this payment. Id.
111. Case no. SFO 0315399, California Workers' Compensation Appeals Board (July
11, 1991).
112. Harty, WCAB 0315399, Opinion on Decision, at 6 (emphasis in original).
113. Id. at 7.
[Vol. 12:95
20
University of Miami Entertainment & Sports Law Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 1 [1995], Art. 5
http://repository.law.miami.edu/umeslr/vol12/iss1/5
WORKERS' COMPENSATION
Inc.114 While playing for the Washington Redskins, Otis Wonsley
received multiple injuries to his knee, ankle, thumb, wrist, and
neck. Wonsley was paid $65,000 for the 1987-88 contract year. The
employer sought credit under Paragraph 10 against any awards
made to Wonsley. Relying on the "plain and unambiguous" lan-
guage of the provision, the board concluded that the credit extends
only to temporary benefits due during the term of the contract.11
The board specifically excluded all permanent benefits from credit.
"[A]n award of permanent disability benefits is an award for pro-
spective relief and [] no credit is permitted against benefits for
permanent or prospective benefits since these benefits do not com-
pensate for a period during which claimant is employed."" 6 We
believe this is a correct interpretation of Paragraph 10.117
2. National Basketball Association
The NBA Uniform Player Contract also includes provisions
concerning workers' compensation benefits. As with the NFL con-
tract, paragraph 20(c) entitles a player injured during performance
of services to receive his full salary for the season in which the
injury occurred.1 18 Additionally, the Club will pay reasonable hos-
pitalization and medical expenses, provided the Club selects the
114. H&AS No. 87-811, District of Columbia Workers' Compensation Order (1988).
115. Wonsley, H&AS No. 87-811, Compensation Order, at 7.
116. Id. The identical result was recently reached by the District of Columbia compen-
sation commission. See Stuart Anderson, et al. v Pro Football, Inc., H&AS Nos. 87-301 et
al., Decision of the Director (Mar. 3, 1995). The Director specifically held that paragraph 10
of the Player's Contract was limited to compensation paid during the period of the contract.
As such, any claim by the club for credit only applies to the compensation payable during
the contract period. Id. at 7. Furthermore, any potential credit could only apply to tempo-
rary disability benefits. All permanent disability benefits provide prospective relief, and
hence, are "not compensation for a period during which the player is employed or under
contract." Id.
117. The applicability of contractual credits is often resolved through arbitration.
These arbitration decisions universally follow the position that the wording and intent of
Paragraph 10 is only to prevent a player from "double-dipping" and receiving more than
100% of their original salary. See National Football League Players Ass'n (Steve August) v.
National Football League Management Council (Seattle Seahawks) (1985) (Kagel, Arb.);
National Football League Players Ass'n (Joe Norman) v. National Football League Manage-
ment Council (Seattle Seahawks) (Jan. 5, 1989) (Kagel, Arb.). As such, arbitration awards
allow credit solely for temporary disability payments made during the period of contract.
See Carl Mims v. Washington Redskins (Aug. 3, 1993) (Stark, Arb.) (allowing offset for
$3,373.44 of undisputed temporary disability benefits); Navy Tuiasosopo v. Los Angeles
Rams (July 29, 1992) (Volz, Arb.) (allowing offset of $1568 because there was no finding of
permanent disability based on injuries).
118. Paragraph 20(c), National Basketball Association Uniform Player Contract. A
copy of the NBA contract can be found in LAW OF PROFESSIONAL AND AMATEUR SPORTS
§ 7.09, at 7-24 to 7-32 (Gary A. Uberstine ed., 1991).
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hospital and doctor. 119 Paragraph 6(b) limits the Club's obligations
reducing them by "any workmen's compensation benefits (which,
to the extent permitted by law, the Player hereby assigns to the
Club) . . . ."1 These provisions differ from the football contract in
that, among other things, they do not specify the types of benefits
the clause affects. Additionally, the contract notes that state law
might limit the right of the Club to the benefits.
3. Professional Baseball Clubs
While the professional baseball uniform player contract is si-
lent about workers' compensation,121 the issue is addressed in their
latest collective bargaining agreement. Article IX(E) deals with
termination pay on injury. If a player is injured during the scope of
employment, the player is entitled to receive the unpaid balance of
his full salary for the year in which the injury was sustained. 2
These payments are then reduced by "workmen's compensation
payments received by the Player as compensation for loss of in-
come for the specific period for which the Club is compensating
him in full. ' 123 By its own language, this contractual set-off ap-
pears to be limited to only temporary disability payments, since
permanent payments are prospective and hence not within the
specific period in which the club is compensating the injured
player. This is similar to the conclusion reached by most courts
and arbitrators in interpreting the language of the NFL Player
Contract.
4. National Hockey League
In contrast to the other sports, the National Hockey League
Standard Player's Contract is silent concerning workers' compen-
sation. If the player is injured during the course of employment,
the club will pay reasonable hospitalization, medical expenses, and
119. Paragraph 6(b), National Basketball Association Uniform Player Contract.
120. Id. Paragraph 20(c) also reiterates this reduction for workers' compensation
benefits.
121. See The National League of Professional Baseball Clubs Uniform Player's Con-
tract. A copy of this contract is available in PAUL C. WEILER & GARY R. ROBERTS, 1993
STATUTORY AND DOCUMENTARY SUPPLEMENT TO CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS ON SPORTS
AND THE LAW 90-96 (1993).
122. Article IX(E), Basic Agreement Between the American and National Leagues of
Professional Baseball Clubs and the Major League Baseball Players Association (1990-1993).
An edited version of the agreement can be found in WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 121, at
55-59.
123. Id.
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doctor bills provided the hospital and doctor are approved by the
club. 12 4 The contract further provides that approval will not be un-
reasonably withheld.2 5 Paragraph 5(d) concerns salary payment.
As with the other professional athletic contracts, salary to the in-
jured player is limited to the term of the contract.'26 There is no
provision, however, requiring reduction of the salary by any work-
ers' compensation benefits received.
IV. TENSION BETWEEN WORKERS' COMPENSATION AND TREATMENT
OF THE PROFESSIONAL ATHLETE
A. The Fallacious Foundation of Restriction
Attacks upon professional athletes' coverage under workers'
compensation usually stem from the misconception that somehow
the system was not intended for professional athletics. 127 This mis-
conception is based on a trilogy of fallacies. First, professional ath-
letes are sometimes perceived to be paid so well that workers' com-
pensation benefits are unnecessary. The reality is that while some
players are extremely well-paid, many are not.128 In particular, the
average journeyman in the NFL is often paid the league minimum,
exposed to higher probability of severe injury, and subject to
shorter than average careers. Regardless, the size of the profes-
sional athlete's salary should be irrelevant to a right of access to
workers' compensation. State workers' compensation programs do
124. Paragraph 5(c), National Hockey League Standard Player's Contract. A copy of
the NHL contract can be found in Joseph M. Weiler, Legal Analysis of the NHL Player's
Contract, 3 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 59, 80-83 (1992).
125. Id.
126. Paragraph 5(d), National Hockey League Standard Player's Contract.
127. Professor Larson describes this as "a sort of vague man-in-the-street notion that
somehow workers' compensation doesn't fit professional sports." LARSON, supra note 7,
§ 22.21(b), at 5-106; see also Tim Reeves, Workers' Comp for Athletes is a Bruising Issue,
PrrTSBUROH POST-GAZETTE, Feb. 14, 1993, at Al (quoting William Titelman, Steeler lobby-
ist, as proclaiming workers' comp was not designed for people like this).
128. ROBERT C. BERRY & GLENN M. WONG, LAW AND BUSINESS OF THE SPORTS INDUS-
TmsS 42 (1986) ("[T]he truth is that many talented athletes never quite make it. For them,
the financial rewards are slim. They perhaps make a comfortable living, for a short time, but
life-long security they do not have."); HOUSE RESEARCH ORGANIZATION, supra note 98, at 40
("Because they are perceived to be overpaid, professional athletes are being singled out
among all other professionals for exclusion from the workers' compensation program."). The
results of a four-month investigation by Newsday found that many players have less protec-
tion than factory workers injured on the job. "Players are often left without financial and
medical assistance from the NFL because the debilitating effects of their injuries do not
show up until after the league-set deadline of three years after retirement for filing a claim."
Bob Glauber, Delay of Game; Who Pays for Pro Football Injuries Long After Playing Ca-
reers Are Over?, NEWSDAY, Sept. 8, 1992, at 110.
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not exclude other employees based upon their salaries. 129 Highly
paid corporate officers and lawyers are included under workers'
compensation. Excluding athletes because of a mistaken belief that
they do not need protection is contrary to the principle of univer-
sal coverage embodied in workers' compensation.
A second fallacy that sometimes supports the misconception is
that players are all under long-term guaranteed contracts. This is
simply false. Extremely few professional athletes have long-term,
guaranteed contracts. 180 Consequently, most players who are in-
jured receive only their salary for that year. 31 There is rarely long-
term employee security in professional sports. 13 2 This misconcep-
tion does not withstand scrutiny.
A final component of the fallacious argument that professional
athletes should not receive workmen's compensation is the concept
of assumption of risk. This is the belief that the player is responsi-
ble for his own injury because he voluntarily agreed to participate
in the game with the knowledge that he may be injured.133 How-
ever, one of the primary reasons states created workers' compensa-
tion in the first place is to avoid this very common law defense.""
Workers' compensation is designed to protect people engaged in
dangerous occupations. " 5 If it is appropriate to exclude profes-
sional athletes, the same analysis can be used to exclude other
dangerous occupations, such as coal miners or construction work-
ers.'3 6 When taken to this logical conclusion, it is clear that this
fallacy, along with its companions, does not support denial of cov-
erage to professional athletes.
B. Judicial Restriction Unwarranted
Nowhere have these myths of the professional athlete had a
129. See LARSON, supra note 7, § 22.21(b), at 5-106 (describing the irrelevance of sal-
ary amount).
130. HoUSE RESEARCH ORGANIZATION, supra note 98, at 40.
131. See LARSON, supra note 7, § 22.21(b), at 5-106 to 5-107 (dispelling the myth of
long-term contract and explaining the one year pay-off); see also subpart III(B) (describing
the salary due to injured professional players.
132. See Reeves, supra note 127, at Al (noting the average NFL career is a brief 3 1/2
years).
133. See Blackistone, supra note 104, at 4B (describing the misconception); LARSON,
supra note 7, § 22.21(b), at 5-107 (labeling this notion as preposterous since it implies the
player intended to injure himself).
134. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
135. Professor Larson correctly notes that while sports are rough, everything about the
game from forbidden practices to preventative gear is designed to reduce injuries. LARSON,
supra note 7, § 22.21(b), at 5-107.
136. Blackistone, supra note 104, at 4B.
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clearer expression than in those judicial decisions which have re-
stricted application of workers' compensation to professional ath-
letes, such as Palmer and Rowe.'17 The Palmer opinion is illustra-
tive.1"8 The court noted that injury was a normal incident of a
professional football game. Despite protective equipment, football
remains "a dangerous pastime fraught with expectation of in-
jury."' " The court concluded that the Missouri workers' compen-
sation program simply did not contemplate injury in the usual
course of such an occupation.' 40 It is clear from the court's own
language that the restriction stems from the assumption of risk fal-
lacy. Professor Larson has labeled this decision as both "wrong"
and "preposterous.""' In a scathing indictment of the court's poor
reasoning,"42 Larson concludes that the opinion is "unworthy of a
legally-trained mind to substitute this kind of superficial reaction
for an accurate analysis that simply accords professional athletes
the same protection under compensation law as is enjoyed by ev-
eryone else who works for a living."" 31 Professor Larson is, of
course, correct. To deny coverage to professional athletes is merely
to acquiesce to the fallacies.
C. Statutory Restriction Inappropriate
1. Special Interest Legislation
In reality, statutory restrictions, whether blanket exclusions or
set-offs, are really examples of special interest legislation for club
owners. Team owners have been the major force behind these
laws."' Their motivation is to increase profitability for the team.
137. For more complete treatment of these cases see supra notes 65-72 and accompa-
nying text.
138. The Rowe opinion uses similar reasoning. See Rowe, 454 A.2d at 878. The Mary-
land legislature has tempered the judicial result in Rowe by amending the workers' compen-
sation statute to prohibit denial because of the degree of risk associated with employment.
See id.; LARSON, supra note 7, § 22.21(b), at 5-103 to 5-104 n.26.2.
139. Palmer, 621 S.W.2d at 356.
140. Id.
141. LARSON, supra note 7, § 22.21(b), at 5-104, 5-107.
142. In fact, except for the initial paragraph of the section, Larson's entire treatment
of the professional sports issue is a five page critique of the Palmer decision. His four major
indictments include: (1) it is the only surviving opinion that denies coverage to athletes; (2)
it is the only case in history where employees have not been protected for doing their job;
(3) it is the only case to find traumatic injuries non-accidental; and (4) it is the example of
resurrection of the assumption of risk defense. See LARSON, supra note 7, § 22.21(b), at 5-
103 to 5-107.
143. Id. at 5-107.
144. See Garrison Wells, Broncos Balk at Players' Big Workers' Comp Costs, THE
DENVER BusiNEss J., Dec. 18, 1992, at 1 (noting that managers and owners are lobbying to
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Some states hungry for the prestige of obtaining or retaining major
professional sports franchises have been accommodating. Where
legislatures have passed these laws, it is clear that they were doing
so with the express intent of helping this special interest group.
Texas is a good example. The bill analysis for the Texas provision
specifically states that the purpose is "to reduce the expenses of
major league sports franchises."1 "5 While there is dispute about the
size of team workers' compensation payments, 14 it still remains
that it is another economic motivation, often described as "team
greed,"'14 7 that has led to these statutory changes. Whatever the
motivation, restrictions on the application of workers' compensa-
tion to professional athletes remain unjustified.
2. Set-Off Problem
While a blanket exclusion of professional athletes from state
workers' compensation programs is inconsistent with the general
objectives of a compensation scheme, workers' compensation is a
statutory right and state legislatures are free to make even unwise
and unfair restrictions. An additional problem, however, comes
into play when states use the set-off method of restriction. Unless
the statute explicitly applies to permanent benefits, these statutes
should be construed as applying solely to temporary benefits. Ap-
plication to permanent benefits is inconsistent with workers'
compensation.
Recall that the workers' compensation system is designed to
differentiate between different types of claims. Temporary benefits
provide an income stream to replace lost earnings during rehabili-
tation. On the other hand, permanent disability payments are pro-
spective relief compensating for future loss.'" The rationale be-
reform workers' compensation laws); Glauber, supra note 128, at 110 (describing team lob-
bying efforts); Smith, supra note 104, at Al (highlighting the quiet lobbying efforts of team
owners).
145. HOUSE COMM. ON BUSIESS AND COMMERCE, BILL ANALYSIS, Tex. S.B. 428, 72nd
Leg., R.S. (1991); see also HOUSE RESEARCH ORGANIZATION, supra note 98, at 40 (characteriz-
ing opponents of the bill as recognizing that it is simply a special interest bill for wealthy
sports teams).
146. One estimate is that teams pay between $ 1 million and $ 3 million per season for
workers compensation benefits. Glauber, supra note 128, at 110. Other estimates exist. See
Reeves, supra note 127, at Al (claiming the Pittsburgh Steelers pay only $ 225,000 per year
in coverage); Wells, supra note 144, at 1 (stating that the Broncos pay $1.2 million per year
in workers' compensation costs).
147. See Smith, supra note 104, at Al (quoting William George, president of Pennsyl-
vania AFL-CIO, as describing the attempts as unabashed greed).
148. See supra notes 40-50 and accompanying text (describing the differences between
temporary and permanent disability payments).
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hind the set-off is to allow an employer a credit if he has continued
to pay the employee his regular wage in order to prevent a double
recovery. '" Without the credit, an injured worker would purport-
edly receive double compensation-both the regular salary and the
duplicative temporary benefit.
The same is not true with permanent benefits. The general
rule is that the employer is not entitled to credit against awards
for permanent disability.1 50 This is because such payments are pro-
spective in nature. Consequently, there is no credit because they
do not compensate for anything the employer paid the employee
during the period of employment. Permanent benefits take the
form of a one time, lump sum payment for partial or total disabil-
ity. It makes no sense to allow a set-off credit in this situation
since there has not even arguably been any double compensa-
tion151. Understanding this distinction, set-off statutes should be
construed consistent with these general principles. If a statute uses
general language, such as "compensation" or "benefits," the rea-
sonable construction given to these terms should be to temporary
benefits only. This is consistent with the general credit rule.152
D. Scope of Contractual Set-Offs Should Be Limited
Just as the scope of statutory set-offs should be limited to
temporary benefits, contractual set-offs should also be interpreted
in is limited manner. Unless so limited, such restrictions would ig-
nore the intent of such set-offs and undermine several of the fun-
damental purposes of workers' compensation. For several reasons,
the only reasonable construction of these contract provisions is to
149. See Herz & Baker, supra note 49, at 15-16 (explaining the rationale for employer
credits).
150. Id. at 15-17.
151. See id. at 15-17 (noting that any claim by an employer for credit against a perma-
nent disability schedule should be vigorously challenged because of the distinction of pro-
spective relief). Professor Larson agrees
When the statute allows a fixed award for 105 weeks for the loss of specified
fingers, there is no authorization for any kind of reduction for that award under
any circumstances. It would obviously be wrong to try to set off specific past
weeks of earnings against some part of the fixed period of benefits assigned to
the loss of a particular member. Whatever the reason, the courts have uniformly
denied credit on a schedule award for post-injury wages paid by the employer.
LARSON, supra note 7, § 57.46.
152. However, using this construction is difficult if the statute specifically identifies
permanent benefits as susceptible to set-off. Compare TEx. LAB. CODE ANN. § 406.095
(Vernon 1994) (using concept of "weekly benefits") with OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.56(C)
(Anderson Supp. 1993) (applying set-off to payments made under temporary disability com-
pensation, partial disability, permanent total disability, and death benefits).
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apply them solely to temporary benefits.
First, the general analysis regarding applicability of employer
credits comes into play. Employers who have bargained for con-
tractual credits have done so on the basis that a credit for tempo-
rary benefits is necessary to avoid double compensation. If an in-
jured player receives both temporary workers' compensation
benefits and his full salary under contract, a player might increase
his income due to injury. Such potential "double-dipping" is pre-
vented with an offset of temporary benefits. A very different situa-
tion exists, however, with permanent disability payments. These
payments do not compensate for wage loss, but for prospective loss
of bodily function. These are for prospective relief and credit to
owners should be eschewed.163
This narrow approach is the one contemplated by the wording
of the baseball collective bargaining agreement. It only allows for
credit for workers' compensation payment "received by the Player
as compensation for loss of income for the specified period for
which the Club is compensating him in full."154 Likewise, the
NBA player contract can be interpreted consistent with this posi-
tion since it both uses the general concept of "any workmen's com-
pensation benefits," and includes the clause that such benefits are
only assigned as permitted by law.1"6
Similarly, the same narrow reading is appropriate for the NFL
player contract. Although the contractual set-off state that it ap-
plies to "temporary total, permanent total, temporary partial, or
permanent partial disability" benefits, it only provides for such a
set-off if the player's salary is paid "for a period during which he is
entitled to workmen's compensation benefits." 156 This limiting lan-
guage has been consistently interpreted by both workers' compen-
sation boards'57 and arbitrators 8 as limiting the set-off provision
of the contract to temporary benefits only. The rationale is simple
and correct: permanent disability benefits providing prospective
relief are not related to the time period during which a player is
drawing salary. It is an award for loss of bodily function and is
unrelated to any time period covered by the contract. As such, it is
153. See supra notes 148-52 and accompanying text (explaining the consensus among
commentators on the narrow applicability of set-offs).
154. Article IX(E), Basic Agreement Between the American and National Leagues of
Professional Baseball Clubs and the Major League Baseball Players Association (1990-1993).
155. Paragraph 6(b), National Basketball Association Uniform Player Contract.
156. Id.
157. See supra notes 111-17 and accompanying text.
158. See supra note 117.
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proper to interpret the reach of this contractual set-off as being
limited to temporary benefits.159
Even if the actual language of the NFL Player Contract did
not limit its reach solely to temporary benefits, other doctrines
should void any possible applicability to permanent benefits. First,
a contrary interpretation would be at odds with the anti-waiver
provisions of state compensation statutes. These provisions pro-
hibit even express waiver of workers' compensation rights by em-
ployees. 160 If the contract could be even read as applying to perma-
nent benefits, this is exactly the type of employer over-reaching
such provisions were designed to prevent.161
Another contract doctrine also bolsters pro athlete resistance
to any proper set-off of permanent benefits-unconscionability.
This doctrine provides that a court can refuse to enforce a provi-
sion of a contract that its deems unconscionable.162 It allows the
court to scrutinize the fundamental fairness of the contract; the
terms must fairly proportion the rights and duties of the con-
tracting parties. 163 While the concept is somewhat amorphous, the
essence of the rule is to prevent unfair oppression or surprise. 64
This is exactly the result if teams are entitled to players' perma-
nent disability awards. When a Club tries to enforce the contrac-
tual set-off provision against permanent benefit compensation,
they are essentially claiming ownership of the player's shoulder or
knee. This type of employer over-reaching is the very essence of
unconscionability. As a result, a player confronted with an at-
tempted set-off of a permanent disability award can find addi-
159. This position is not only consistent with workers' compensation board and arbi-
trator decisions, but also with other legal interpretations of the contract. See Letter from
John R. Wasberg, Assistant Attorney General, Attorney General of Washington 1 (Mar. 26,
1992) (on file with author) (interpreting Paragraph 10 to exclude permanent partial disabil-
ity benefits).
160. See supra notes 24-28 and accompanying text (discussing anti-waiver provisions).
161. The State of Washington is an example. Washington has an anti-waiver provi-
sion. WASH. REv. CODE § 51.04.060 (West 1990) ("No employer or worker shall exempt him-
self or herself from the burden or waive the benefits of this title by any contract, agreement,
rule or regulation, and any such contract, agreement, rule or regulation shall be pro tanto
void."). The Attorney General's office takes the position that this statutory provision pro-
hibits set-off of permanent partial disability benefits paid to players. See Letter from John
R. Wasberg, Assistant Attorney General, Attorney General of Washington 1 (Mar. 26, 1992)
(on file with author).
162. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1981) (describing the doctrine
of unconscionable contracts).
163. Gary A. Uberstine, Enforceability of Agreements, in LAW OF PROFESSIONAL AND
AMATEUR SPORTS § 9.03[1][c][i][D] (Gary A. Uberstine ed., 1991).
164. JOHN D. CALMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CONTRACTS § 9-40, at 406 (3d ed. 1987).
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tional shelter in this affirmative defense.16 5
Finally, public policy mandates against enforceability of con-
tractual set-offs against permanent benefits. Allowing such set-offs
is directly contrary to the quid pro quo purpose of workers' com-
pensation. 161 If teams can recoup these benefit payments, they end
up with the best of both worlds. They have statutory immunity
from tort suit, plus they receive reimbursement for the permanent
workers' compensation payments.1 67 If this is a permissible out-
come for professional athletic contracts, all employers would sim-
ply include such a provision in their employment contracts. This
would disintegrate the very core of the exclusivity of remedy
forged at the beginning of the century by granting the employer
the full benefit of the workers' compensation system - limited lia-
bility, predictability, reduced costs - while completely depriving
the employee of both the common law right to sue and the very
benefits the system is designed to provide. Obviously, this is not a
desirable public policy result. Contractual set-offs should be lim-
ited for this reason alone.
Finally, allowing a contractual set-off would create a disincen-
tive to improve workplace safety. Creating a financial incentive for
employers to enhance safety is one of the core features of workers'
compensation. 68 The realization that a team may have to pay life-
time permanent disability benefits for sending an injured player
back into a game promotes safety. If these benefits can be com-
pletely recouped by the team at minimal expense, the safety incen-
tive disappears.6 9 In an occupation where injury rates exceed sev-
enty percent,170 public policy should void contractual provisions
that create a disincentive to workplace safety. 71
E. Post-recovery Suits Should Be Prohibited
A new, pernicious development in workers' compensation is-
sues for the professional athletes is the filing of a post-recovery
165. The defense of unconscionability applies to professional athletic contracts. See
Uberstine, supra note 163, at § 9.03[1][c][i][D].
166. See supra notes 23-28 and accompanying text (discussing the quid pro quo of
workers compensation).
167. See Smith, supra note 104, at A6 (explaining how the set-off thwarts the premise
of workers' compensation).
168. See supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text (describing the safety incentive).
169. See Smith, supra note 104, at A6 (noting that one of the most serious problems
with the set-off is safety disincentive).
170. See supra note 104.
171. These public policy arguments have equal force in limiting statutory set-offs to
only temporary benefits.
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suit. After a former player has received permanent workers' com-
pensation benefits, the club brings suit on a contract provision
seeking reimbursement of the workers' compensation benefits. A
recent example of such a cynical tactic is the Dallas Cowboys." 2 In
two separate actions,173 the Cowboys organization sued former
players on their contracts seeking reimbursement of disability pay-
ments that these players received. The most recent suit involves an
attempt to recover $900,000 from sixteen former players. 74 Some
of these worker's compensation settlements have been earmarked
for specific future surgeries. 75 The Cowboys' motivations are ap-
parently greed and intimidation, despite the fact that the bulk of
the former players ended their careers before the new ownership
even gained control of the Cowboys.1 76 If successful, the Cowboys'
action will discourage current and former players from filing disa-
bility claims.
The former players were victorious in the first lawsuit. In An-
krom v. Dallas Cowboys Football Club, Ltd.,' 77 the Cowboys sued
former player Scott Ankrom for compensation benefits he received
following his departure from the club. The Cowboys, who had not
protested the compensation award to the commission, intervened
after the insurance carrier settled. The Cowboys claimed a contrac-
tual right to recover Ankrom's permanent disability benefits based
upon paragraph 10 of the NFL Player Contract. The court of ap-
peals dismissed the Cowboys' claim for failure to exhaust its ad-
ministrative remedies. Specifically, the court held that the club
was required to pursue its claim for a credit or offset before the
Workers' Compensation Commission.' Consequently, the court
172. Richard A. Oppel & Doug Bedell, Profit-driven Builds Fiscal Champs, THE DAL-
LAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 30, 1994, at 1A, 20A; Dallas Cowboys Seek $900,000 from Former
Players, CCH Workers' Compensation Business Management Guide Newsletter, Feb. 11,
1994, at 1.
173. The first lawsuit was Ankrom v. Dallas Cowboys Football Club, Ltd., 900 S.W.2d
75 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1995, writ denied).
174. See Ed Werder, Suit Stuns Former Cowboys, THE DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan.
12, 1994, at 28A (describing the most recent suit). The suit was brought against Tony Hill,
John Dutton, Michael Downs, Doug Cosbie, Gordon Banks, Benny Barnes, Doug Donley,
Todd Fowler, Felix Hooven, Keith Jones, Phil Pozderac, Mike Renfro, Herb Scott, Tony
Slaton, Dom Smerek, and Glen Titensor. Hall of Famers, Tony Dorsett and Randy White,
could have been included but were not. See Gary Cartwright, Vain Glory, TEXAS MONTHLY,
June 1994, at 113. It should be noted that one of the authors, Mr. Carlin, and his law firm
represent the defendant players in this action.
175. See Cartwright, supra note 174, at 113 (noting insurance settlements earmarked
for surgeries).
176. Werder, supra note 174, at 28A.
177. 900 S.W.2d 75 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1995, writ denied).
178. Id. at 78.
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did not reach the merits of the contractual claim. Nonetheless, the
court's dismissal lends support for the proposition that administra-
tive agencies are the appropriate forum for resolving workers' com-
pensation disputes." 9
While the outcome of the second lawsuit is still pending, juris-
dictional problems and system exclusivity mandate player vic-
tory.180 The entire concept of these post-recovery suits directly
conflicts with the jurisdictional objective of having workers' com-
pensation claims fully resolved in an administrative forum. The
administrative agency is simply the superior forum to resolve these
disputes."8 ' The agencies have the requisite expertise to resolve
just such disputed claims. To allow an end-run around the admin-
istrative agency will stifle the very advantage of efficiency workers'
compensation strives to achieve.
Further, allowing prosecution of post-recovery suits such as
these, flies against the goal of exclusivity. The foundation of the
workers' compensation system is based upon the quid pro quo.18 2
Both employees and employers enjoy the legislative compromise
which balances the swift and certain compensation for the injured
employee against the employer's tort immunity and capped bene-
fits. A post-recovery suit thwarts this exclusive, efficient remedy by
forcing the athlete to litigate strictly limited claims and then per-
mitting the employer to recoup those benefits a completely differ-
ent forum. In fact, if a player tried to sue on his contract for bene-
fits, he would be barred by the exclusivity provision of the state
statute. 8' A double standard that permits a club to do the very
thing that a player can not is impermissible.
V. CONCLUSION
Recent efforts by some states endeavor to restrict pro athlete
179. See id. at 80.
180. Additionally, all of the arguments against enforcement of the contractual set-offs
have equal force against the post-recovery suit. See supra notes 153-72 and accompanying
text.
181. See Workers' Comp: More Athletes Seek Benefits, TRIAL, June 1988, at 87 (not-
ing that the workers' compensation system provides a more efficient and economical way of
compensating the injured athlete); see also supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text
(describing the superiority of an administrative remedy over a judicial one).
182. For complete discussion of the quid pro quo see supra notes 23-26 and accompa-
nying text.
183. See Brinkman v. Buffalo Bills Football Club, 433 F. Supp. 699, 702 (W.D.N.Y.
1977) (holding a player suit for breach of contract for failing to provide medical care was
barred by the New York State Workmen's Compensation Law); accord Rivers v. New York
Jets, 460 F. Supp. 1233, 1238 (E.D. Mo. 1978).
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WORKERS' COMPENSATION
access to workers' compensation benefits are unwarranted. From
its inception, the workers' compensation system has served many
desirable goals. Few can object to the desirability of certain,
prompt, and reasonable compensation for occupational injuries. As
was clear at the beginning of the century, this can best be achieved
through an administrative remedy, rather than the slow and costly
judicial process. An equally important by-product of this system is
the creation of incentives for employers to improve workplace
safety. All of these objectives are jeopardized by squeezing the pro
athlete from workers' compensation coverage.
While most states include athletes in their workers' compensa-
tion system, the growing trend is toward restriction through either
statutory exclusion or benefit set-offs. These statutory methods of
exclusion are premised on various fallacies concerning the income
of professional athletes, their contract status, and their assumption
of the risk of injury. Workers' compensation is, of course, a crea-
tion of state legislatures. While they are free to craft the system as
they wish, more careful scrutiny of the justification for pro athlete
restriction is necessary. Where ambiguity exists under current
state statutes, the wisest course is to interpret such statutes consis-
tent with the general principles of universal access. At the very
least, statutory set-offs should apply solely to temporary benefits,
not permanent ones.
Likewise, contractual restrictions, which have some vitality in
the context of temporary benefits, have pushed into the domain of
permanent impairment benefits. Applicability of contractual set-
offs to permanent benefits is clearly inappropriate. Those trying to
strip these benefits from players deliberately ignore the fundamen-
tal distinction between the purpose of temporary and permanent
benefits to further their avarice. Hopefully, these attempts will be
foreclosed by those having a more sophisticated understanding of
the nature and purpose of workers' compensation becoming in-
volved in the negotiation and drafting of specific contractual terms
in professional athlete's contracts to prohibit these ongoing restric-
tion efforts. Because an employer must abide by its contract if it
provides benefits in excess of statutory limits, the players can be
protected through specific prohibition against recoupment or limi-
tation of injury benefits.
1995]
33
Carlin and Fairman: Squeeze Play: Workers' Compensation and the Professional Athlete
Published by Institutional Repository, 1995
34
University of Miami Entertainment & Sports Law Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 1 [1995], Art. 5
http://repository.law.miami.edu/umeslr/vol12/iss1/5
